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ABSTRACT 
Continuous technological advances have allowed that mobile devices, such as Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), can execute 
sophisticated applications that more often than not must be equipped with a layer of security that should include the 
confidentiality and the authentication services within its repertory. Nevertheless, when compared against front-end computing 
devices, most PDAs are still seen as constrained devices with limited processing and storage capabilities. 
 
In order to achieve Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC), which was an open problem proposed by Adi Shamir in 1984, Boneh 
and Franklin presented in Crypto 2001, a solution that uses bilinear pairings as its main building block. Since then, IBC has 
become an active area of investigation where many efficient IBC security protocols are proposed year after year. In this paper, 
we present a cryptographic application that allows the secure exchange of documents from a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) 
that is wirelessly connected to other nodes. The architecture of our application is inspired by the traditional PGP (Pretty Good 
Privacy) email security protocol. Our application achieves identity-based authentication and confidentiality functionalities at the 
80-bit security level through the usage of a cryptographic library that was coded in C++. Our library can perform basic primitives 
such as bilinear pairings defined over the binary field  and the ternary field , as well as other required primitives 
known as map-to-point hash functions. We report the timings achieved by our application and we show that they compare well 
against other similar works published in the open literature. 
 
Keywords: Identity-based identity, bilinear pairings, PGP, mobile devices. 
 
RESUMEN 
Los incesantes avances tecnológicos han permitido que los dispositivos móviles, tales como los Asistentes Digitales 
Personales (PDAs), puedan ejecutar aplicaciones sofisticadas que usualmente no realizaban, para lo cual deben estar 
equipadas con una capa de seguridad que debe incluir en su repertorio los servicios de confidencialidad y autenticación. Sin 
embargo, este tipo dispositivos comparados con servidores, aún exhiben limitaciones en procesamiento y almacenamiento. 
 
Con la finalidad de hacer realidad la criptografía basada en la identidad (IBC por sus siglas en inglés), la cual fue considerada 
un problema abierto propuesto por Adi Shamir en 1984, Boneh y Franklin presentaron en Crypto 2001, una solución que usa 
emparejamientos bilineales como su bloque principal. Desde entonces, IBC ha sido un área activa de investigación en la cual 
muchos protocolos eficientes de seguridad son propuestos año tras año. En este articulo, presentamos una aplicación 
criptográfica que permite el intercambio seguro de documentos de un Asistente Digital Personal (PDA), el cual es conectado 
de forma inalámbrica con otros dispositivos. La arquitectura de nuestra aplicación está inspirada en el tradicional protocolo de 
seguridad de correo electrónico PGP (Pretty Good Privacy). Nuestra aplicación alcanza las funcionalidades de autenticación y 
cifrado, ambos basados en la identidad con un nivel de seguridad de 80 bits, a través del uso de una biblioteca criptográfica 
que fue codificada en C++. Nuestra biblioteca implementa primitivas básicas tales como emparejamientos bilineales definidos 
sobre los campos binarios  y el ternario , así como otras primitivas requeridas, conocidas como funciones picadillo 
map-to-point. Presentamos también los reportes de los tiempos obtenidos por nuestra aplicación y mostramos una 
comparación de los mismos contra otros resultados publicados en la literatura abierta. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last few years we have witnessed the 
exponential growth of mobile computing. 
Nowadays, it is possible to receive/send multimedia 
information in mobile devices connected through 
wireless LANs. Mobile applications rank from 
weather predictors to financial transactions, mobile 
e-commerce and so on. However, typical 
computational constraints of mobile devices still 
constitute a challenge to proven security solutions 
already in place in the wired Internet scenario. 
Therefore, most of the time, designers are forced to 
use highly efficient protocols striving to keep the 
computational complexity of security algorithms as 
low as possible, looking for light cryptographic 
schemes in terms of both execution time and 
footprint size. 
 
The security model of symmetric or secret-key 
cryptosystems is based on the notion that only 
authorized communication parties have access to 
certain secret information, known as secret key. The 
security model of this paradigm works under the 
assumption that any eavesdropper that manages to 
obtain a ciphertext while in transit will not be able to 
recover the corresponding plaintext due to the fact 
that he/she will still ignore the exact value of the 
secret key. Symmetric encryption/decryption can be 
performed with extremely high efficiency. However, 
this paradigm has two major drawbacks, namely, its 
inherent key distribution problem and the fact that key 
management when working in a large community of 
users, tends to be cumbersome. These two issues 
can be solved by means of the public-key 
cryptography paradigm that was first proposed by 
Diffie and Hellman in 1976. The Diffie-Hellman 
protocol allows two parties to agree on a shared 
secret key, even though they are under the restriction 
of exchanging messages in public. Shortly after, 
Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman proposed the RSA 
cryptosystem in 1977. Today, RSA is one of the most 
widely known public-key systems. 
 
In the public-key model, each party is assigned with 
a pair of keys, one secret and the other one public, 
and therefore, the encryption/decryption process is 
not symmetric anymore. Public-key encryption 
permits the definition of the digital signature 
concept as well as a stronger notion of 
authentication. Nevertheless, it remains as an open 
problem to establish a binding between the public 
key, a digital object, and its legitimate owner. In 
practice, this issue has been solved by means of 
the so-called Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI), which 
defines trusted certification authorities that are in 
charge of issuing digital certificates. A digital 
certificate allows uniquely determining the 
ownership of a given public key. 
 
Since the work by Boneh and Franklin in 2001 [1], 
we know how to implement Identity-Based 
Cryptography (IBC) efficiently using a mathematical 
tool called bilinear pairings. In the case of IBC, the 
concepts of certification authorities and digital 
certificates disappear. Instead, we can define 
user’s public key to be any user’s public information 
such as his/her email address or any social number 
identification. Hence, in principle we eliminate both 
the expensive key exchange protocols required in 
symmetric cryptography as well as the costly 
verifications needed under the PKI scheme. 
 
PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) is an email security 
standard that combines secret-key and public-key 
cryptography to offer the confidentiality service 
efficiently. PGP uses a web of trust in order to provide 
an authentication service based on good reputation 
among the system’s users. However, this mechanism 
is not well-suited for e-commerce applications where 
such trust model simply cannot be applied, among 
other reasons, because of legal issues. 
 
Our Contribution: In this paper we present a PGP-
based application for a PDA device, that is able to 
offer the confidentiality and authentication services 
using Identity-Based Cryptography. Our application 
allows achieving a reasonable level of 80-bit of 
security without resorting to the costly verifications 
of digital PKI certificates or the unsecure PGP 
scheme known as web of trust. In order to do this, 
we develop a C++ library that allows us to 
implement the basic operations required by identity-
based secure protocols. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We 
discuss in Section 2 basic cryptographic concepts 
of bilinear pairings and the Identity-based 
Cryptography. Section 3 presents the identity-
based encryption/decryption and 
signature/verification algorithms used in this work. 
Then, in Section 4 we describe our mobile 
application for secure exchange of documents: 
identity-based PGP. Section 5 reports the timings 
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achieved by our tool as well as a comparison with 
other related works previously published in the 
literature. Finally, in Section 6, some concluding 
remarks are drawn. 
 
2. Basic concepts 
 
A finite field is a set having finitely many elements 
in which the usual arithmetic operations (addition, 
subtraction, multiplication, division by nonzero 
elements) are well defined. Moreover, all usual 
algebraic laws, namely, commutative, associative 
and distributive laws hold. The order of a finite field 
is defined as the number of elements  that it 
contains. Such a finite field exists for every prime    
and positive integer , and contains a subfield 
having  elements. This subfield is called the 
ground field of the original field. For the rest of this 
work, we will consider:  , with  . 
 
A polynomial   in   is irreducible if   is not a unit 
element and if   then   or   must be a unit, that is, a 
constant polynomial. Let   be an irreducible 
polynomial over   of degree  , and let   be a root of  
, i.e.,  . Then, we can use   to construct a finite field   
with exactly   elements, where   itself is one of 
those elements. Furthermore, the set forms a basis 
for  , and is called the polynomial (canonical) basis 
of the field. 
 
2.1 Bilinear Pairings 
 
The equation of a supersingular elliptic curve 
defined over the underlying field  ,  where   is 
a prime and  is a positive integer, is given as, 
 
 (1) 
where the coefficients  and  belong to . 
Let  denote the group of all points   
that satisfy Equation 1, with . It is known 
that the set  together with the point , form 
an abelian additive group. The elliptic curve scalar 
multiplication is the operation that computes the 
multiple , defined as the point resulting of 
adding ,    times. 
 
Let  be a positive integer such that 
 and  denote the 
set of points  , with order , i.e., 
.  
 
The embedding degree  , is defined as the least 
positive integer such that , holds. Let 
 be a point in   and let us 
define  as the multiplicative group  , 
with identity 1 and order . 
 
Then, a bilinear pairing on   is a mapping   
 satisfying the following 
properties: 
 
1. Bilinearity:         
a.    
b.    
2. Non-degeneracy:    
3. Computability:  can be efficiently computed 
 
The bilinear property implies the following: Let 
  
 
 
In this work, we use the bilinear pairing called   
[2]. To implement it, we utilize fields of 
characteristic two  and characteristic three  
. Our library computes all the basic arithmetic 
operations, namely, addition, squaring, 
multiplication, modular reduction, square/cubic root 
and inversion in an efficient way using tower fields. 
 
2.2 Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) 
 
The theoretical concept of Identity-Based 
Cryptography (IBC) was originally proposed by 
Shamir in 1984 [3]. The IBC is considered part of 
public key cryptography, but with a special feature: 
user’s public key can be any user’s non-
confidential public information that can identify a 
given user in a unique way. On the other hand, the 
private key is generated by a special entity called 
Private Key Generator (PKG), using its master 
private key and the user's public information. As a 
result, the IBC reduces the complexity for 
establishing and managing the public key 
authentication framework known as Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) previously alluded [4]. 
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As we mentioned above, the PKG is a special 
entity that generates all user’s private keys, which 
means that the PKG has a dangerous and 
privileged position. In general, the overall system’s 
security depends on several considerations like the 
security of the underlying cryptographic functions, 
the secrecy of the sensible information stored by 
the PKG, the user's authentication performed by 
the PKG to create the private key, and the user's 
precaution to prevent the loss, duplication or 
usurpation of sensible information [3]. 
 
Figure 1 shows the interaction among the 
aforementioned entities. The user's public key is 
, and the private key is derived from  . It is 
necessary a single interaction between a given 
user and the PKG. When the public operation is 
used to encrypt, the scheme is called Identity-
Based Encryption (IBE), otherwise, it is named 
Identity-Based Signature (IBS). 
 
The IBC can be divided into two branches: pairing-
based schemes and factoring-based schemes. In 
this work, we focus on the first of them. In 2001, 
Boneh & Franklin proposed an identity based 
encryption using pairings [1], additionally, Florian 
Hess in 2003 [5] presented an identity-based 
signature scheme based on bilinear pairings. 
However, the pairing implementation is 
complicated and the calculation of the bilinear 
pairing needs to be completely efficient such that 
the benefit of using schemes based on pairings 
can improve any other public cryptographic 
scheme. In order to obtain the best solution to 
solve this problem, researchers have developed 
efficient implementations of bilinear pairings; the 
interested reader can see [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. 
 
3. Identity-based cryptography using bilinear 
pairings 
 
3.1 Identity-Based Encryption 
 
In an identity-based cryptosystem, the encryption key is 
any unique user's identification   and the 
decryption key  is derived from   and the seed . As 
a consequence, it is not necessary to have a separated 
channel in order to obtain the encryption key. This 
scheme is presented in Figure 2. 
 
We utilize the identity-based encryption algorithm of 
Boneh & Franklin [1] which is given by four algorithms: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Identity-based cryptosystem (IBC). 
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• Setup: define the private system parameter s 
which is only known by the PKG, and the public 
system parameters , 
where  is an additive group generated by point
 and   is a multiplicative group, both of order  
,   is an special function 
called map-to-point hash function,  
 with  as the string's length 
and  is the global public key. 
 
• Extract: given a public identity , 
compute the public key   
and the private key  , calculated by 
the PKG. 
 
• Encrypt: choose a random  and 
calculate the ciphertext for the message  as 
follows,  . 
 
•=Decrypt: given , compute  
 
 
This operation is used to decrypt a message. Due 
to the bilinear pairing properties, the last equation 
is equal to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Identity-Based Signature 
 
An identity-based signature scheme is as a mirror 
with respect to the identity-based encryption 
counterpart. To carry out the signing and verifying 
operations, message  is signed with private key 
, both  and signature  are transmitted. 
Thereafter, any entity can verify  , using the 
sender's public key . The general steps of the 
identity-based signature are shown in Figure 3. 
 
We utilize the identity-based signature proposed by 
Hess in 2003 [5] that produces a signature in four 
phases: 
 
• Setup: choose a scalar  , compute . 
Two hash functions are used: 
 and  
,   and  are the 
PKG’s private and public keys, respectively. Hash 
function   receives two inputs: a message   
and one element in  . 
 
• Extract: given a public identifier , 
the PKG computes public key 
 and private key 
  . 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Identity-based encryption. 
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• Sign: given the signer's private key , and 
message ; the signer chooses 
randomly  and a scalar   
and calculates: 
 
 
The pair   is a signature for message . 
 
• Verify: given  , message , and signature 
, the verification is as follows:     
 
 
 
The signature is valid if and only if . 
In order to prove this step, we once again use the 
bilinear pairing property, so that 
, and 
 ,  
we have: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. PGP With IBC 
 
Before presenting our identity-based PGP 
application, we would like to mention some works 
which have been published in order to offer the 
confidentiality and authentication services in mobile 
devices. 
 
Several authentication protocols have been 
proposed for this scenario. For example, in [12, 13], 
authors presented protocols based on elliptic curve 
cryptosystems. With respect to the confidentiality 
service, Niansheng et al. [14] implemented AES 
(Advanced Encryption Standard) in mobile devices. 
 
In the context of bilinear pairings in which we 
mainly focus our attention, Kawahara et al. [15] 
presented an efficient implementation of Tate 
pairing on a mobile phone using Java as their 
programming language. They reported significant 
fast timings and concluded that the cryptosystems 
based on pairing could be efficiently implemented 
in mobile phones.  
 
Unfortunately, we could not find some protocols 
such that both services, authentication and 
confidentiality, were offered using identity-based 
cryptography. For this reason, we presented in this 
section an efficient implementation which was 
motivated in PGP protocol (Pretty Good Privacy) 
[16], this implies that we developed the basic block 
of security (encryption/decryption; sign/verify) with 
 
Figure 3. Identity-based signature. 
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the main idea of guaranteeing the confidentiality and 
authentication services over a specific mobile device: a 
Personal Digital Assistant (PDA). 
 
4.1 Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 
 
PGP was created by Philip R. Zimmerman [16]. This 
protocol provides confidentiality and authentication 
services when digital information is sent through 
Internet. 
 
PGP combines secret and public key cryptography. 
The functionality to encrypt a message is as follows. 
First, the sender uses PGP to create a session key, 
which is the secret key that is used to encrypt the 
plaintext. Then, the session key is encrypted with a 
receiver’s public key and it is transmitted along with the 
ciphertext to the receiver. To decrypt, the receiver 
uses his/her private key to obtain the session key that 
is used to decrypt the ciphertext and get the message. 
 
In order to offer the authentication, data integrity, and 
non-repudiation services, this scheme uses a hash 
function on the message to be signed. Let us call 
the result of such hashing message digest. 
Then, a message digest is signed by the signer 
using his/her private key. The plaintext and the 
signature are transmitted to the receiver that 
uses the sender’s public key to verify the 
signature. 
 
4.2 PGP using IBE 
 
Figure 4 shows the encryption and decryption 
operations. We now discuss this figure from left 
to the right. First, the sender generates a 
random session key (128-bits) which uses a 
private key in the cipher AES to encrypt the 
plaintext. The IBE scheme is utilized to encrypt 
the session key with a sender's public key. Then, 
the sender transmits the ciphertext and the 
encrypted session key to the receiver. On the 
right side, the receiver requests her/his private 
key  to PKG and uses it to decrypt the 
session key which is a private key of AES. 
Finally, the receiver decrypts the ciphertext. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. PGP Id-based encryption/decryption. 
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4.3 PGP using IBS 
 
In this process, our application takes a message 
and produces the corresponding 256-bit message 
digest, which is signed using the sender’s private 
key  that was previously generated by the 
PKG. On the other side, any entity verifies the 
signature, producing the message digest and using 
the sender’s public key. Figure 5 illustrates the 
signature and verification process. 
 
5. TIMINGS 
 
This section presents the timings obtained for all 
basic cryptographic primitives using the bilinear 
pairings. Our system was implemented in a PDA 
Sharp Zaurus-5600 that has an Intel Processor 
XScale 400 MHz PXA250, ROM Memory of 32 Mb, 
RAM Memory of 64 Mb, TFT LCD Screen 3.5" 
(240x320 pixels) and Operating System Linux2 
(Embedix3). Regarding the software, the library 
was developed in C/C++ Programming Language 
and GNU/Linux Compiler. To generate test vectors, 
we used MAPLE Language. 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the architecture of our 
application divided by layers. From a left-to-right 
perspective, the first layer represents the arithmetic 
of the binary and ternary fields required to obtain 
the bilinear pairing function. The next layer depicts 
the cryptographic primitives and the last layer 
represents all possible applications that can be 
implemented using the bilinear pairing function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. PGP Id-based signature/verification. 
 
Figure 6. PGP Id-based cryptography in a PDA. 
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Table I presents timings results on the PDA device 
for the  bilinear pairing function in   and . 
 
Table II illustrates the execution time of basic 
operations on the PDA architecture. Both 
encryption/decryption and signing/verifying were 
tested with a message-length of 128 bits. The 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
difference of times between characteristic two 
and three is due to the special hash function 
map-To-point. As shown by Barreto & Kim [8], 
one can implement efficiently the map-to-point 
function in characteristic three by solving a 
cubic equation over . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finite field Bilinear pairing Time ms
 29.5 
 66.9 
Table 1. Times obtained for the bilinear pairing operation on the PDA. 
Operation 
Characteristic 2 
 
Characteristic 3 
 
Encryption (IBE) 95.085 ms 78.8 ms 
Decryption (IBE) 30.4 ms 67.4 ms 
Signature (IBS) 46.7 ms 88.396 ms 
Verification (IBS) 123.37 ms 143.6 ms 
Map-to-point 58.2 ms 7 ms 
AES Encryption 220 ms 
AES expansion key 20.2 ms 
Table 2. Time obtained in basic blocks on PDA. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
We implemented six main building blocks and 
modules, namely, two   bilinear pairing functions 
on finite field   and ; the AES cipher 
algorithm, two map-To-point functions on   
and  , and the SHA-256 function hash.  
 
The combination of all these blocks together 
produced a fully functional application of PGP using 
Identity-Based Cryptography on a Personal Digital 
Assistant (PDA). 
 
We obtained good efficiency in our application, 
thanks to the use of programming language C++ 
along with the use of efficient pairings algorithms. 
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